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NOTES 
1. Pereboom assumes throughout the work that there are various types of 
freedom, and specifies what type of freedom he is discussing in various con-
texts. 
2. See John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: All Essay 011 Control 
(Cambridge Mass Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 140-141, "Recent Work on 
Moral Responsibility," Ethics, vol. 110 (1999), pp. 93-139, and in Fischer and 
Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), pp. 100ff. 
3. The arguments he considers are largely from Jaegwon Kim, 
Supervenience and Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and Free Will 
Theists by John B. Cobb JI. and Clark H. PilIDock, eds. Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000. $26.00. 
LEWIS S. FORD, Old Dominion University 
Process theists follow Whitehead in requiring that their theology be ade-
quate in the sense that every item of experience, including the findings of 
science, can be interpreted in terms of their philosophy. Free-will theists 
have a rather different notion of adequacy in mind: it must be adequate to 
Scripture as broadly interpreted within the evangelical tradition. 
Although starting from such diverse perspectives, they have much in 
common. In particular both endorse what is known as "open theism," that 
God does not know future contingents, not because there is some peculiar 
limit on divine omniscience, but because future contingents are simply 
unknowable per se. God knows the actual as actual, the possible as possi-
ble, but not the possible future as if it were already in some sense determi-
nately actual. 
Traditional treatments of omniscience attempt to preserve immutability. 
God's knowledge could only be immutable if it were already completely 
determinate. Such traditional accounts assume that God must be complete 
and fully self-sufficient to be perfect. That is the proper meaning for a per-
fect being. Process theism sees God as becoming, and therefore adopts a 
different standard of perfection: that which, no matter how great, can 
always be further enriched. Open theists recognize the extent to which 
God is portrayed as temporally engaged, facing an indeterminate future. 
David Griffin and William Hasker, whose contributions frame the vol-
ume, explore the differences. One concerns creation ex nihilo. This is not in 
the first instance the cosmological question about the beginning of the 
world, although process theists need to take more seriously than they have 
the claim by astrophysicists that time and the world began with the Big 
Bang. It is more the question whether God can be complete and self-suffi-
cient alone, or whether God requires some sort of world as a source of nov-
elty and enrichment. It also concerns divine power, as pure persuasion 
does not appear able to explain creation ex nihilo. 
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For process thinldng God requires a world to love, whereas open theists 
find Jove already within a social trinity, and insist that the existence of the 
world is contingent upon a divine decision. For them this expresses the 
transcendence of a necessary God over a contingent world. If, however, 
perfection needs enrichment, there must be an other to provide that enrich-
ment. A social trinity may provide a home for love, but after some aeons 
wouldn't the personae become bored with one another? Adventure, the 
quest for new perfections, is a metaphysical excellence for process theism 
appropriate for God, not just an accidental appendage. 
Hartshorne and Griffin hold that metaphysical principles, e.g. that some 
world or other exists, are beyond divine determination. Whitehead, howev-
er, held that God "at once exemplifies and establishes the categoreal condi-
tions." If so, God could choose a purely deterministic world, although it 
would make little sense, there being no way it could provide God with any 
novelty. It would be no better than a world God could fully imagine, or no 
world at all. In determining the metaphysical principles for our world, God 
could agree to live by those principles in dealing with our world. This is the 
truth in the kenotic view proposed by Rice (p. 188ff). In some such fashion 
it seems possible to mediate between process and open theists on this issue. 
Rice, who pioneered open theism in 1980, situates it between classical 
theism and process theism persuasion. Classical theists typically under-
stand omnipotence in terms of unilateral power. Open theists argue that 
God acts sometimes coercively (as in creation or miracles) God usually acts 
persuasively, respecting creaturely freedom. Process theists insist that God 
acts only persuasively. 
David Basinger alleges an inconsistency in Divine Power in Process 
Theism (reviewed in Faith and Philosophy 8/1 (January 1991), 124-27). On 
the one hand, process theology claims persuasive power is superior to 
coercive power, yet on the other hand it holds that "God is morally culpa-
ble if he has coercive power but fails to use it ... if there are times when 
God should employ coercive power, how can its exercise be inherently 
immoral?" (p. 193). 
We should not restrict ourselves to persuasion versus coercion. There is 
a prior issue involved. Is God's activity part of the regular course of 
things, so that it is exercised in all events? Or can there be supernatural 
interruptions? Process theism has sought to conceive of God's activity as 
purely regular. In such a context divine power must be persuasive, if there 
is to be any freedom. 
Open theism is proud of the fact that it allows for both persuasive and 
coercive divine power. ("Coercive power" is misleading. We should talk 
in terms of determinative power, as Hasker suggests. God's power in creat-
ing the world is hardly coercive, since there did not as yet exist anything, 
which could be coerced.) But any special determinative act introduces an 
element of supernatural intervention, for otherwise events can be consid-
ered to be influenced by past events, divine persuasion, and self-determi-
nation. 
If divine activity is natural and continuous, then it must be persuasive. 
If divine activity is occasionally determinative, then determinative acts 
should happen more often than they do to prevent egregious evil. Even if 
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this were to curtail some freedom and soul making, it would be worth it. 
While process and open theism largely agree on temporalistic omniscience, 
they part company, as we have seen, with respect to divine power. 
Although appreciating divine persuasion, open theists insist upon omnipo-
tence as the norm, even if it is self-limited in most cases. Besides Hasker 
and Griffin, who debate the major differences, Rice, Howell, and Wheeler 
take up more mediating positions. 
Wheeler in particular explores what elements an evangelical can learn 
from process theism. His finely nuanced essay suggests further ways in 
which the discussion may be taken. He presents the evangelical position in 
terms of National Association of Evangelicals 1942 statement of faith (p. 
111), and explores its ramifications in terms of process theism, including 
the question of Biblical authority. He indicates other areas such as the 
Body of Christ, the earth community, and eschatology where dialogue 
could be especially fruitful. 
Finite and Infinite Goods, by Robert Adams. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. Pp. 424. $45.00 (hardcover). 
TIMOTHY CHAPPELL, Department of Philosophy, University of Dundee, 
Dundee, Scotland. t.d.j.chappell@dundee.ac.uk 
This remarkable book is a milestone in ethics and in philosophy of reli-
gion. Directly, it is the fruit of thought and reflection on ethics over at least 
ten years- from Robert Adams' Wilde Lectures in Oxford in 1989, to its 
publication in 1999. Equally but less directly, it represents, co-ordinates 
and systematises Adams' writings on ethics over the whole of the last 
quarter-century. Those who know Adams' distinguished work at the cut-
ting edge of analytical philosophy of religion will come to this book with 
high expectations. I believe they will not be disappointed. Anyone who 
thinks that there is nothing new in philosophy of religion, or that secular-
minded ethicists need know no more about theistic ethics than the 
Euthyphro Dilemma, had better think again. 
If I were requested to sum up Finite and Infinite Goods in a single sound-
bite, I think the sound-bite would have to be "generosity of intellect and 
imagination". One of Adams' chief gifts is his Bach-like ability to take a 
simple theme and show how much can be done with it: how widely and 
how differently different variations on that theme can be applied and reap-
plied. It is this intellectual generosity and imagination that holds together 
what would otherwise be an unwieldy and inchoate variety collection. The 
book is vast in. its ambition and its scope, covering everything from the 
semantics and metaphysics of value to eros, idolatry and martyrdom. It is 
only Adams' exceptional ability to keep a grip on his "big picture" that 
enables him to tell a coherent story about so many different regions of our 
life and thought. 
The book is divided into four sections. Part I, "The Nature of the Good," 
